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Abstract
Social security administrative data are increasingly becoming available in many coun-
tries. These data have a long panel structure (large N, large T) and allow for the
measurement of many different variables with high accuracy. It also captures short-
term unemployment spells which are normally unavailable in survey data due to its
design. However, the measurement of unemployment differs in both types of datasets.
The resulting gap between total unemployment and registered unemployment is not
constant acrossworkers characteristics or time. In this paper, I present a simple, system-
atic method to expand the raw Spanish Social Security administrative data. I identify
unemployedworkers who are not receiving unemployment benefits, using information
from the institutional framework and using the Labour Force Survey as a benchmark.
The resulting unemployment rates and labour market flows are comparable across
both datasets. Administrative data can also overcome some of the problems of the
Labour Force Survey, such as changes in the structure of the survey. This paper aims
to provide a comprehensive guide on how to adapt administrative datasets to make
them useful for studying unemployment.
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Administrative datasets are gaining popularity among economists.1 They offer some
advantages over traditional Labour Force Surveys. Most administrative datasets can
identify firm-worker pairs and have detailed and extensive working histories (large
N, large T). However, using these datasets for the study of unemployment presents
some challenges. Firstly, these data were not designed for research, but rather for
administrative bookkeeping: calculating contributions to the social security and benefit
entitlement of workers. Secondly, the definition of unemployment used in administra-
tive datasets is not the same as the International Labour Office (ILO) standard. Finally,
in some countries the administration only keeps track of the unemployed while they
are receiving benefits.
These discrepancies are particularly relevant for the case of Spain. Since 2004,
the Social Security and the Ministry of Labour of Spain has made one such admin-
istrative dataset available to researchers: the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales
(MCVL). This dataset provides complete employment histories of 4% of the Spanish
Labour Force in a given year. It can be linked to anonymised tax records, providing
comprehensive information on wages and benefits. TheMCVL adopts the administra-
tive definition of unemployment: only workers receiving unemployment benefits are
considered to be unemployed. This measure systematically excludes individuals who
have not accumulated enough contribution periods to be eligible for unemployment
insurance. These are mostly young workers in short temporary contracts. Moreover,
after the 2008 financial crisis, the number of workers whose unemployment benefits
had expired increased considerably. As a result, the unemployment rate as measured
by the Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa) diverged substantially
from the MCVL. By the end of 2013, there was a gap of 10 percentage points between
the two measures of unemployment.
This paper aims to reconcile this gap by expanding the administrative definition of
unemployment in two ways. Firstly, unemployed workers whose benefits run out will
appear in the administrative data as if their spell was over. This has been noted by
previous authors (García Pérez 2008). The first expansion, which I call the long-term
unemployment (LTU) expansion, adds themissing days between the end of a registered
unemployment spell and the next employment spell to correct for these artificially
short spells. Secondly, workers that are not entitled to any unemployment benefits
will not appear as unemployed. Using the institutional framework, three possible
situations emerge: quits, workers with too short tenures to qualify for benefits and
self-employed workers out of a job. I identify spells corresponding to these cases and
add them to the MCVL. I refer to this expansion as the short-term unemployment
(STU) expansion. Including these spells is crucial for young people and women, who
have a higher incidence of part-time and temporary contracts. This approach refines the
most common approach in the literature, which considers all non-employment spells
1 See for example Moffitt (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), Tattara and




as unemployment.2 Together, both expansions can explain most of the gap between
the two data sources, supporting the use of the MCVL for the study of unemployment.
The paper then shows how the expandedMCVL can complement the Labour Force
Survey for the study of labour market flows. The MCVL can be used to address two
of the main challenges faced when trying to quantify labour market transitions: non-
responsiveness of the unemployed (attrition) and changes in the survey design. In the
first case, up to one in five unemployed individuals fail to respond to two consec-
utive interviews.3 This overstate flows from unemployment to employment—which
are mostly to temporary work. The MCVL does not suffer from attrition problems,
as it tracks all of the changes in the status of individuals (except flows into non-
participation). The 2005 change in survey design creates breaks in the transition rates
of temporary and permanent workers in the LFS. The MCVL does not fundamen-
tally change in this period, so using the 2005 wave it is possible to examine these
changes. Finally, the MCVL allows for the observation of high-frequency transition
rates. Due to its quarterly frequency, the Labour Force Survey is not adequate to cap-
ture very short, frequent employment–unemployment spells. The MCVL can identify
these spells with precision, making it a valuable tool for the study of frictional and
youth unemployment. This last observation has broader implications beyond Spain, as
young workers across Europe are becoming more exposed to unstable employment.
From mini-jobs in Germany and zero hour contracts in the UK to the gig economy
worldwide.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the two datasets, their advan-
tages and disadvantages. Section 3 presents the unemployment gap between the LFS
and the MCVL and discusses its likely sources. Section 4 expands the MCVL def-
inition of unemployment, comparing the resulting unemployment figures with the
Labour Force Survey estimates. Section 5 provides further robustness checks. Sec-
tion 6 demonstrates the uses of comparable data sources for the study of labour market
flows. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
This section explains themain characteristics of the two data sources I employ through-
out the paper: the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS hereafter), elaborated by the
National Statistics Institute (known as INE), and theMuestra Continua de Vidas Labo-
rales (MCVL), provided by the Spanish Social SecurityAgency. It offers a comparison
between the two and outlines how to structure the latter as a quarterly panel.
Official unemployment statistics come from the Spanish LFS, which follows a
representative sample comprising over 100,000 people for six consecutive quarters.
The INE provides population weights which enable population level estimates to be
constructed from the sample. These weights will be used in this paper when report-
ing stocks, as they also correct some sampling errors. The LFS classifies a worker’s
2 See for example Rebollo-Sanz (2012), Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez (2015), Nagore Garcia and van
Soest (2017), Bentolila et al. (2017) and Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2018).
3 This is at its worst in the year 2005, but it is over 15% most of the quarters in the 2005–2013 period, as
Fig. 19 in Sect. 6.1 shows.
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employment status by asking them to report their activities in the week of the inter-
view. In particular, if they were employed or if they searched for a job.4 Based on their
answers, the LFS can identify when a worker is out of the labour force and why which
is its main advantage over administrative data.5 The LFS can also account for informal
work arrangements, to the extent that workers are honest about their answers.6 The
unit of observation is the individual response at the quarter of the interview. Linking
the different quarters by the individual’s identifier gives the survey a rotating panel
structure.
However, many participants do not reply in all of the six quarters in which they are
supposed to be part of the sample. This leads to problems when calculating stocks and
building labour market transitions. The population weights help to correct for non-
responsiveness when building labour market stocks, but they do not correct flows. This
is because the weights indicate how many other individuals are in the population are
represented by the interviewee. If one individual fails to respond to the survey, the
sample weights can be readjusted to reflect this. However, two consecutive observa-
tions are required in order to record labourmarket transitions. If one respondent misses
an interview in one quarter, the weights cannot be used to recalculate the importance
of the remaining individuals that have two consecutive observations as they do not
account for people conditional on their status in a past survey. As a result, the stocks
(counting observations in each labour state) are correct using the weights, but the flows
are not. This issue is further discussed in Sect. 6.1. Note that this is a problem that
affects all Labour Force Surveys and is not specific to Spain.
Another complication arises from changes in the survey design. Two notable
changes, in 2001 and 2005, affected unemploymentmeasurement and produced breaks
in the series.7 These changes did not affect the stocks of unemployedworkers, although
they did alter labour market flows. I will revisit this issue in Sect. 5.
The MCVL is comprised of the entire working histories of a 4% sample of the
working population extracted each year from 2005 onwards. Similar datasets exist for
4 In particular, I use the variables Type of Contract to identify employees, Current working situation for
the self-employed and the variable AOI for unemployed and out of the labour force individuals. This last
variable combines the answers to other key variables (“Were youworking this last week?”, “Are you looking
for a job?”/“Are you ready to work in the next 15 days?” and “What type of contract do you hold?”). This
variable is the one used for the official unemployment rate series by the government, the EUROSTAT and
OECD.
5 If the respondent is not employed nor looking for a job it asks her to declare the reason by choosing one
of 9 possible answers. These include studying, thinking she is not going to be able to find a job and caring
for others, among others.
6 A simple test consists of looking at the proportion of individuals that declared to be receiving unemploy-
ment benefits but also report themselves as not searching for a job. Being an active searcher is a requirement
to receive unemployment benefits. By declaring themselves in this situation, the individuals admit their
irregular position. The proportion of claimants in this situation reaches 30% of the total in the 2005–2007
period. This proportion drops to nearly zero after 2008. Therefore, many individuals seem to be honest even
when they are revealing some irregularity in their situation. Other than this test, which is more likely to be
an underestimate, it is hard to quantify how many workers are in irregular employment.
7 In 2001 the requirement for unemployed workers to be available for work in the next two weeks was
introduced. This change caused a shift in the stock of unemployed in 2001. In 2005, twomeaningful changes
were introduced: the sample compositionwas altered to reflect changes in the population and surveys shifted
to an electronic format instead of phone calls.
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Portugal, Germany, Italy, Austria and the US, among other countries.8 The sample size
is large, with over 1 million individuals in each year. In contrast to other administrative
datasets, the MCVL contains information on self-employed individuals as well as
employees and unemployed workers. There are anonymised identifiers for individual
workers and firms. This feature is highly valuable for labour economists, as it allows
for the observation of job-to-job transitions and the identification of recalls to the same
employer. The LFS lacks information on the employer and therefore cannot provide
this information. There, the unit of analysis is the employment or unemployment spell.
This feature is useful for the estimation of duration models, although to study labour
market flows one has to transform the individual-spell structure into an individual-
quarter labour status.
There are two sources of wage information in the MCVL. Firstly, using the worker
identifier and an establishment code the working histories file can be linked to the
social security contributions file. These contributions specify the gross salary upon
which firms have to make contributions to social security. As with similar datasets,
these wages are top-coded. Secondly, using the individual worker and firm identifiers
the working histories panel can be linked with the “Income Tax complement”. This file
contains income tax information on wages, other forms of payment, unemployment
or disability benefits, severance payments and any other flow of income between the
firm (or the administration) and the worker. The tax file contains declared profits from
economic activities. Although that information is highly susceptible to misreporting
for tax avoidance purposes, it nevertheless provides some insight into self-employed
earnings. Researchers working with these data have used both sources. Bonhomme
andHospido (2017) show how to adapt the contribution file to studywage and earnings
dynamics.
Despite all of its useful information, it is important to note that the MCVL is not
a matched employer–employee data. The unit of measurement is the worker, not the
firm. Therefore, observing two or more workers at the same firm is unlikely. In other
words, the firms in the MCVL are not representative of firms in Spain.9
The main disadvantage of the MCVL is that in its original format the data are not
useful for research. Organising and cleaning the data requires a considerable amount of
time and knowledge of Spanish legal terms. This challenge arises because theMCVL is
an extraction of administrative records. The LFS, in contrast, is built with researchers
in mind. Over the years, different academic articles have been written explaining
how to clean and format the data [see García Pérez (2008), Lapuerta (2010), Arranz
et al. (2011), López-Roldán (2011) or the online appendix in Roca and Puga (2017)
for example]. In particular, García Pérez (2008) provides the most comprehensive
guide on the treatment of unemployment in the MCVL. It explains how to deal with
overlapping employment spells and censored unemployment spells. However, after
cleaning and formatting the data, there is still the question of how to treat unemployed
workers who are not registered as unemployed. These periods appear as gaps between
observed spells. This is a common feature with other administrative datasets, but in
8 See Tattara and Valentini (2010) for a complete summary.
9 However, because it is representative of self-employed individuals, the coverage of small firms is better
than large firms. This representation issues may be useful, as most firms in Spain are very small.
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Spain, this issue is especially relevant because of the prevalence of very short and very
long unemployment. These issues and how to deal with them are at the core of this
paper.
In principle, it would be possible to build a panel earlier than 2005, using the
information on the past working histories of workers. Some spells date back as far
back as the 1960s. However, both García Pérez (2008) and Arranz et al. (2011) warn
against doing this kind of inference as the sample is representative of the year of
extraction. The 2005 file is representative of the working population of Spain in 2005.
Every subsequent year new spells are added to adapt to demographic changes. The
MCVL does not drop any worker. The cases of workers not appearing in a given year
are either migration, transitioning out of the labour force or deaths.10 The MCVL
includes pensioners in its sample, so retirement is not a cause for dropping out. Using
the 2005 file to study the labour market in the 2 or 3years prior would cause minor
representativeness problems. However, using the MCVL to look further back would
over-represent younger workers. For this reason, it is best to use all of the individual
year files. Arranz et al. (2011) provide an algorithm to merge these files while con-
solidating all individual observations. However, for some applications, using only the
latest year can offer some advantages. The later waves have fewer discontinuities and
overlaps, more variables and greater accuracy. In particular, it is easier to calculate
spell duration. In this paper, I will use each year file from 2005 to 2013, consolidating
all of the information into a single unbalanced panel.
Table 1 summarises the advantages and strengths of the dataset as described above.
3 The unemployment gap
In order to compare unemployment in both datasets, it is necessary to format theMCVL
into a quarterly panel format. The formatting and panelling procedure is detailed in
“Appendix”. The main strategy to transform the MCVL into a panel uses the first two
weeks of every quarter as a reference period. It then classifies workers in their current
employment status. If the worker has more than one status in these two weeks, the last
observed status is chosen. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide robustness checks on these
assumptions.
The main challenge when classifying worker status in the MCVL is that unem-
ployment and non-participation cannot be clearly distinguished. In this paper, the
definition of unemployment used is the same as in the standard ILO definition (which
coincides with the LFS). It follows that the differences in between the MCVL and
the LFS unemployment series will represent unemployed workers that are missing in
the administrative data or the LFS. For example, frictional unemployment is unem-
ployment by the ILO definition but is often not captured by the LFS. The timing and
structure of the surveymean that this kind of unemployment is unlikely to be recorded.
The marginally attached (those who are not employed nor actively searching) would
not be unemployed by that definition. These cases should not be included the MCVL.
However, we cannot exclude these cases from the MCVL without some imputation.
10 The MCVL records the date of passing.
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Table 1 Data comparison table
Labour Force Survey Administrative data (MCVL)
Description Rotating panel of quarterly
interviews with a sample size of
over 100,000. It is available from
1987
A sample of about 1,000,000 job
records of people who have any
sort of affiliation with the Social
Security. It constitutes a panel since
it follows most of the same people
from 2004
Advantages Detailed and accurate information for
personal characteristics (such as
education)a
Firm and worker identifiers allow for
the study of job-to-job transitions
(not available in the LFS)
It has the potential to track labour
status changes that are made out of
the scope of administrative records
(first job seekers, informal market
jobs, inactive workers)
Very accurate information on
employment spells, with precise
dates of entry and exit into and out
of jobs/unemployment
Can be matched to a fiscal dataset for
wage/benefit information
Consistent through time
Disadvantages Fails to capture short-term jobs and
some very short unemployment
spells due to its quarterly frequency
It can’t track anyone who has no
formal relationship with the Social
Security Agency. As such, it does
not track people outside of the
labour force well
There are important series breaks in
1992, 1999, 2001 and 2005
For the same reason, it is also unable
to track informal labour market
activities
aAlthough there have been some improvements on the measure of this variable in the MCVL as noted by
Roca and Puga (2017), this variable is still unreliable, according to the 2018 MCVL user guide manual
That imputation would require constructing a “propensity to be marginally attached”
measure with observables in both the LFS and the MCVL. This approach is not fol-
lowed for three reasons. First, the set of personal characteristics variables common
to both datasets is small.11 Building a propensity score in the LFS and applying it in
the MCVL would introduce noise which will be difficult to measure. The LFS mea-
sure of attachment is already a noisy estimate.12 Although I choose to follow the ILO
definition, most labour economists consider the marginally attached as being unem-
ployed. For all of these reasons, I find that trimming the marginally attached from the
administrative data is not worthwhile for the purpose of this paper.
As a final note, the LFS and the MCVL have a different number of observations:
an average of 108,136 in the LFS13 and 678,183 in the MCVL. In order compare the
11 Some key variables, like education, occupation and sector are defined differently in both datasets or
they are highly aggregated.
12 This is true even after cleaning up the frequent UNU transitions (unemployment to non-participant to
unemployment) the LFS as in Elsby et al. (2015).
13 The weighted Labour Force Survey has a mean of 31,360,266 observations per period—which amounts
to the total population of working age in Spain.
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Fig. 1 Unemployment rate in Spain
two datasets, I express the labour market stocks as shares of the labour force for the
remaining of this paper.
After building the MCVL into a panel, we can compare both datasets. Figure 1
shows the unemployment rates from the raw MCVL data and the LFS. There is a
growing disparity between the two, that reaches ten percentage points by the second
quarter of 2013. These differences persist across age groups and gender: Fig. 2 shows
the gap was wider for women before 2008 and Fig. 3 shows that it is very large for
young workers. By the end of the sample, their unemployment rate in the MCVL is
half that the LFS. Moreover, in the MCVL the unemployment rate of young workers
appears to trend down from 2010, while in the LFS it is rapidly increasing.
The main source of this discrepancy is the different definitions of unemployment:
• The LFS considers a person unemployed if: (1) they are not currently employed,
(2) they are actively looking for a job and (3) they are ready to start working within
the next 15 days.
• The MCVL considers a person unemployed if: (1) she has been in the social
security system before (had a previous job) and (2) is receiving unemployment
benefits.
In other words, the MCVL excludes all unemployed people whose benefits have
expired. The Spanish Social Security Agency does not record any other benefit for
those who exhaust their unemployment compensation. All of those unemployed for
more than 2years (4years for some groups) are missing from the registry.14 As long-
term unemployment reached 60% of total unemployment by the end of 2013, this




Fig. 2 Unemployment rate by sex
Fig. 3 Unemployment rate by age. Source: MCVL and the LFS
is the principal potential source of disagreement. The first expansion deals with this
issue by extending observed spells until the start of the next job or until the end of the
sample.
The Social Security agency also excludes all individuals without the right to claim
unemployment compensation. That is the case for those who have less than a year of
employment in the last 4years.15 The second expansion aims to recover these spells by
15 Before 1992, the threshold was six months of contributions. The labour reform of that year increases the
minimum to twelve. No other major reform, including the most recent 2012 one, has changed this threshold.
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adding gaps between employment spells of those without the right to claim benefits,
under certain conditions.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is another potential source of the disparity is
that the MCVLmay be counting some inactive workers (by the definition of the LFS )
as unemployed. That is individuals who are not actively searching for a job or are not
ready to work in the next 15 days. Notice however that if this was the primary source
of disparity, then the MCVL unemployment rate would be above the LFS. That is not
what we observe in the data, except for older workers.16
4 Unemployment expansions
The disparity between both datasets suggests that there may be some unemployment
missing from the MCVL.
This section shows how to implement two simple unemployment expansions to
capture the missing spells. The long-term unemployment (LTU) expansion includes
unemployment spells beyond the expiration of unemployment benefits. This expansion
is routinely applied in the empirical literature (see García Pérez 2008; Rebollo-Sanz
2012;Bentolila et al. 2017; Fernández-Navia 2019 for example). The short-termunem-
ployment (STU) expansion aims to capture unregistered unemployment spells which
do not count as unemployment by the administrative definition. These are mostly
very short, frictional unemployment spells. It offers an alternative to counting all
gaps between spells as “non-employment”, which is the other approach followed in
the literature (see for example Rebollo-Sanz 2012; Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez
2015; Nagore Garcia and van Soest 2017; Bentolila et al. 2017; Rebollo-Sanz and
Rodríguez-Planas 2018).
This section contrasts the resultingunemployment rates after each expansion against
the LFS, which provides some insights into the different treatments of unemployment.
4.1 LTU expansion
Given the importance of long-term unemployment in Spain, it seems natural to extend
those spells that become right-censored due to benefit expiry until the start of the next
job. This expansion is already noted byGarcía Pérez (2008) as a necessary treatment to
workwith unemployment in theMCVL. However, many of the long-term unemployed
have not found a job by the end of the sample. Figure 4 shows that merely adding the
days before another job spell does not help to reconcile the post-2009 trend in both
datasets. Comparing this series with the raw MCVL series, it makes little difference.
The LTU expansion adds all of the unfinished unemployment spells by the end of
2013, as well as extending the duration of registered unemployment spells between
jobs as before. Unfinished spells were very prevalent at the end of 2013. These spells
could be a lesser issue for researchers using later years as the end of their sample. My
approach is to extend all unfinished spells after benefit expiration. This assumption
16 I consider workers who transition from unemployment to retirement as out of the labour force. They
are unlikely to engage in active search, thus not counting as unemployed for the LFS.
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Fig. 4 Unemployment rates—LFS and expanded social security. Source: MCVL and the LFS. The LTU
expansion—only finished spells series is calculated by applying the LTU expansion but excluding right-
censored spells as the end of 2013
fits the trend of the LFS better than other specifications. Section 5.1 provides a robust-
ness check on this assumption, showing that imposing restrictions on the duration of
unfinished spells does not seem to affect the main results.
After this expansion, both trend and level are closer to the LFS, as shown in Fig. 4.
However, the expanded series is still below the LFS by 3.7–2.5 percentage points by
the end of 2013.
4.2 STU expansion
In order to close the gap between unemployment rates, we need to add the unemployed
individuals without the right to claim. That is the case of:
• Quits into unemployment. Voluntary terminations of employment do not entitle
workers to unemployment compensation.
• New entrants to the labour market (with no previous employment record).
• Workers with employment spells below the minimum requirement—less than a
year of employment in the last 4years. Young and temporary workers are partic-
ularly susceptible to this, lacking the right to claim.
• Self-employed workers are not entitled to unemployment insurance.17
17 This rule changed in the 2012 reform, but the change was not effective until 2013. For most of the
sample, self-employed workers do not have the right to claim.
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These spells tend to be shorter than the rest, as they represent frictional unemploy-
ment: short unemployment spells between jobs. This is therefore called the short-term
unemployment (STU) expansion. To identify these spells, I chose to include all gaps
between employment spells that lasted at least 15 days18 where at least one of the
following conditions was also fulfilled:
• The worker quit her last job.
• The worker was self-employed in her last spell.
• The worker had not contributed enough to be eligible.19,20
In addition to these restrictions, I added the requirement that the worker is not to be
recalled towork on the same firm. Fujita andMoscarini (2017) noted that the dynamics
of unemployment for those workers whose unemployment spell ends in a recall are
very different from the rest. María Arranz and García-Serrano (2014) documented
this for the case of Spain. Recalled workers may have little incentives to search and
may answer “no” to the question “did you look for employment this week?” in the
LFS. This case is particularly relevant for Spain because employers have incentives
to use this tactic to extend the maximum duration of temporary contracts. Instead of
renewing the contract beyond the 2-year limit, the firm can ask the worker to take a
short leave and then rehire her.21
Finally, it is likely that some unemployment spells are censored at the end of 2013,
as was the case with the LTU expansion. However, if we observe the worker over
a long period of registered unemployment, we have some assurance that the worker
was indeed looking for a job in this period. Restricting STU spells to those which
end in a job strongly suggests that the worker was looking (and eventually obtained)
employment. However, with right-censored gaps, it is harder to distinguish a transition
into non-participation froma true unemployment spell. For this reason, I have restricted
unfinished non-employment gaps that qualify for a STU expansion to be of at most
3 years in duration.22 Section 5.1 checks for alternative specifications, showing that
there is not much difference between 3, 4 or 5 years, but there are significant changes
18 This restriction aims to exclude likely job-to-job transitions and small clerical errors. Other authors (see
Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez 2015; Bentolila et al. 2017 for example) also take this approach.
19 The threshold, as stated before, is less than 360 days of employment, according to Spanish legislation.
This threshold does not change for the period of study.
20 The law in Spain does not allow to claim benefits for the days leftover in the last unemployment spell. For
example, consider a worker has three months left of benefits and finds a six-month job. After that job ends,
she cannot claim the three missing months from her last unemployment spell. However, she can choose not
to claim benefits when she first becomes unemployed. In that case, after her six-month contract, she can
claim her previous unclaimed benefits plus two more months for her six-month job. In this way, workers
can save unemployment benefits for later. This mechanism may explain why the number of claimants rose
significantly during the recession.
21 It is hard to quantify the extent of this practice, since it is illegal. However, using data from the LFS, in
the 1999 to the 2013 period an average of 24.9% of temporary workers report to have been working for their
current employer for more than 2years—9.6% report 5 years or more. This is only possible if the employee
was laid off and rehired by the firm at least once.
22 In comparison, Rebollo-Sanz (2012) chooses to censored all spells being at most 2 years. For her
period of study (the 2005–2008 period), it makes sense to limit the length of unemployment spells given
the low long-term unemployment rate. For studies that also looks at the recession period, the 3years limit
is preferred—see for example Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez (2015) and Bentolila et al. (2017).
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Table 2 STU expansion spells,
by type. Source: MCVL
Quit Self-employment No right to UI
Total 173,186 100,907 622,164
Percentage 19.32 11.26 69.42
Fig. 5 Age distribution by expansion. All spells in the 2005–2013 period, by expansion. Source: MCVL
in trend unemployment if we use all censored unemployment spells or if we use only
those lasting for 2years or less.
These conditions ensure that inactive individuals are not counted in the STU expan-
sion. Table 2 shows the breakdown of spells by which of the three conditions above are
met. The majority of spells belong to individuals who did not have the right to claim
unemployment benefits. Self-employment and quits also account for a significant frac-
tion of these spells. Figure 5 shows the distribution for the ages of the unemployed at the
start of their unemployment spell. Unemployed individuals from the STU expansion
are overwhelmingly younger, with 80% of them under 40.
Figure 6 shows that STUspells aremore likely to originate from temporary contracts
than in the LTU expansion.23 Future spells are alsomore likely to be another temporary
job. If we exclude self-employment, 86% of all previous spells in the STU addition are
temporary jobs, while the LTU and the raw data only have 70% and 74%, respectively.
The vast majority of unemployed workers coming from self-employment are only
counted in the STU expansion. The spells added by the STU expansion are also
shorter than those of the LTU expansion, as Fig. 7 shows. I do not restrict any of
the very short registered spells in the raw data. Tables 4 and 5 show the detailed
23 This plot excludes spells beginning or ending in self-employment. These are more frequent in the STU.
As explained before, self-employed workers had no right to claim unemployment benefits, so only the STU
expansion manages to capture them.
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Fig. 6 Contract type before and after. All spells in the 2005–2013 period, by expansion. Source: MCVL
Fig. 7 Histogram of spell duration, by expansion. Source: MCVL. RawMCVL refers to spells not affected
by either expansion, while LTU and STU expansion refer to spells affected by each expansion, respectively
results. These very short registered spells in the raw data are unlikely to appear in the
unemployment calculations. Table 3 in “Appendix” provides more detailed statistics
of the unemployment spells by expansion.
Figure 8 shows that after the STU expansion, the MCVL unemployment rate gets
closer to the LFS, although there is still an overestimation of unemployment before
2009. The differences become smaller towards the end of the sample. It is not surpris-
ing that the STU expansion results in more unemployment than the LTU expansion
in the 2005–2008 period. These years coincide with the construction boom during
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Fig. 8 Unemployment rates—short gaps expansion. Source: MCVL and the LFS
Fig. 9 Unemployment rates by gender. Source: MCVL and the LFS
which temporary contracts represented over 30% of total employment. In the follow-
ing years, the gap reduces as the importance of long-term unemployment grows. The
STU expansion has a similar trend to the LTU expansion and the LFS.
We can gain some insights into the difference between the two expansions by look-
ing at the unemployment rates broken down by gender (Fig. 9) and age (Fig. 10). By
gender, the STU expansion brings the MCVL closer to the LFS for women. The inci-
dence of temporary contracts and part-time employment is higher among women,
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Fig. 10 Unemployment rates by age group. Source: MCVL and the LFS
which may explain why non-claimants of unemployment benefits seem to matter a lot
for their unemployment rate. The STU expansion explains less of the gap for men,
particularly before 2008. Notice that even the raw MCVL overestimates unemploy-
ment in this period. The construction sector was booming in the 2005–2008 period.
This sector employed mostly young men in temporary contracts, which could explain
the overestimation of the STU expansion in this period. After the recession, the gap
becomes much smaller.
Looking at age: the STU expansion helps to reconcile the unemployment rates of
younger workers, in a way that the LTU expansion is not able to match. There is a
positive gap in the 2006–2008 period, likely due to young men on temporary con-
tracts. For middle-aged workers, the differences mirror those in Fig. 8: unemployment
is overstated by the STU expansion, more so at the beginning. Here the LTU expansion
arguably performs better. For older workers, there is little difference between expan-
sions, perhaps because of the smaller incidence of frictional unemployment among
older workers. Each of the expansions offer a more coherent picture of the overall
labour market than the raw MCVL series.
The importance of the LTU and STU expansions changes before and after the
recession. Figure 11 shows the histogram of all unemployment spells (not just the ones
in the panel) before and after 2008 by expansion and contract type. Both LTU and non-
expanded spells increase during the recession for both contract types, reflecting the
longer durations of regular unemployment. On the other hand, STU expanded spells
fall during this period, this is mostly due to those coming from temporary contracts.
Figure 12 shows this fall is mostly driven by quits and also by a small drop in short-
term employment (those who are ineligible to claim benefits). The fall in the number
of quits reflects that during the expansion it was easier to find jobs for those who quit
their previous employment. This points towards lower mobility during the recession:
workers that would separate during an expansion prefer to keep their jobs during a
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Fig. 11 Unemployment spells by expansion, before and after the 2008 Recession. Source: MCVL. Raw
number of unemployment spells, by unemployment expansion and contract type. Pre 2008: 2004–2008.
Post 2008: 2009–2013
Fig. 12 STU expanded spells by type, before and after the 2008 Recession. Source: MCVL. Raw number
unemployment spells affected by the STU expansion, by category. Pre 2008: 2004–2008. Post 2008: 2009–
2013
recession. Figures 24 and 25 in “Appendix” provide a more detailed breakdown by
year.
These results confirm the idea that the LTU expansion is the main driver of the
widening gap between theLFS and theMCVLafter the recession. In addition, account-
ing for unregistered unemployment is important (particularly for young workers and
women) but it is a less relevant source of unemployment in the recession.
5 Robustness checks
This section checks the consistency of the results from the previous section against
different ways of counting unemployment in the MCVL. In particular, I look at the
maximum length of extension for unfinished spells, the two reference weeks (whether
they are on the first, second or third month of the quarter) and the rules for choosing
overlapping spells in the reference period. Additionally, using information from the
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Fig. 13 Maximum duration of expanded unfinished spells, by expansion. Source: MCVL and the LFS
LFS, I provide more evidence of the kind of unemployment added in each expan-
sion. Because the LFS allows unemployment to be distinguished from inactivity, and
workers report whether they are receiving benefits, we can say something about the
possible biases upwards and downwards of the MCVL.
5.1 Expanding unfinished spells
Recall that when implementing the LTU expansion it was crucial to extend unfinished
unemployment spells until the end of the sample. However, a possible concern is that
some of these extensions correspond to individuals who are dropping out of the labour
force.
Notice that one of the advantages of theMCVL is that it allows for the identification
of pension beneficiaries. Therefore, individuals transitioning to retirement orwho have
become permanently incapacitated will not be included in this expansion. The cases
of individuals dropping out of the labour force that are likely to be captured by this
expansion include emigrants, full-time (unsupported) carers and students.
A simple test of the decision to extend unfinished unemployment spells is to restrict
the extension to those spells ending within the 2, 3, 4 or 5 years before the end
of the sample. In this way, we can restrict some of the long-term non-participants
from the LTU expansion. The left panel of Fig. 13 shows the result of imposing these
restrictions. There is very little difference overall, with the most substantial difference
between the 2-year restriction and the original being two percentage points. There is
also a noticeable gap between the 2- and the 3-year restrictions. The likely reason
for this distance is the increase in job destruction in 2008–2009. Workers losing their
jobs in these years with a maximum extension of 2 years should lose their benefits
around 2010–2011. Overall, it seems that not imposing any restriction does not lead
to a persistent, noticeable increase in measured unemployment.
The right panel of Fig. 13 shows the results of a similar exercise for the STU expan-
sion.Recall that in the STUexpansion unfinished, non-registered unemployment spells
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Fig. 14 Changing the reference weeks, by expansion. Source: MCVL and the LFS
within 3years of the end of the sample are extended. This extension can potentially
capture more inactive workers than the LTU expansion, as the latter required workers
to be actively searching for employment before losing their benefits. By not regis-
tering with the employment office, individuals added in the STU expansion could be
signalling that their intention is to become inactive.
The results in Fig. 13 suggest that allowing all unfinished spells in the sample to be
extended increases measured unemployment noticeably: the gap between the baseline
(3 years) and extending all spells reaches 4.6 percentage points at the end of 2011. By
the end of the sample, the differences among the rest of the series are in the range of
1 percentage point. However, note that the 2-year threshold series misses the trend of
the LFS. The 3-year and 4-year thresholds manage to capture the upwards trend of the
2011–2013 years better. This better fit is likely due to their ability to capture workers
that were dismissed in this period, which saw an increase in job destruction. This
exercise provides some empirical backing for other studies that also choose a 3-year
limit for non-employment spells, as in the case of Rebollo-Sanz and García-Pérez
(2015) and Bentolila et al. (2017).
Overall the differences are not large, except for when expanding all unfinished
STU spells without restrictions. This result supports imposing some restriction on
these extensions in the STU expansion. The LTU expansion yields similar results to
the baseline.
5.2 Different reference periods
When constructing the unemployment series, I chose to focus on the first two weeks of
each quarter. Recall that the LFS carries out interviews throughout the three months of
each quarter. What would happen if we choose a different period for selecting worker
status in a given quarter?
Figure 14 shows the results of using different reference fortnights for the rawMCVL
series and both expansions. The lines are very close to each other. This result supports
the idea that the choice reference period does not influence the results. In Figs. 26, 27
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Fig. 15 Different choosing criteria, by expansion. Source: MCVL and the LFS
and 28 in “Appendix”, I take the first difference of all series and compare the seasonal
patterns to those of the LFS. Choosing the first month of each quarter seems to deliver
the closest fit to the seasonal patterns of the LFS. This additional result gives a weak
preference for the first fortnight, but this choice is ultimately irrelevant to the results.
5.3 Different overlapping spells criteria
In some cases, workers have more than one spell in the two-week reference period.
The last spell in the quarter is used in order to decide the state of the worker. For
example, if a worker starts a period unemployed but ends with a temporary job the
temporary job is used. The assumption is that the individual has a good idea of her
situation by the end of the two weeks. However, this may not be the case for many
workers.
An alternativewould be to give preference to employment. TheLFSasks individuals
to report if they have worked in the last week. If they respond affirmatively, the LFS
classifies them as employed—even when workers know they are going to be dismissed
soon or are already non-employed.
Figure 15 shows the result of both approaches for the MCVL original series and all
expansions. As expected, the unemployment rates when preferring employment are
marginally lower. However, the differences are not substantial. The most significant
discrepancy, in the STU expanded series, is of 0.7%. These small differences are not
relevant for comparing unemployment, but they may matter for other applications.
5.4 Alternative LFSmeasures
The motivation of the LTU expansion was that the MCVL was excluding individuals
whose unemployment benefits have expired. The LFS includes a variable that codes
the self-reported relationship to the Public Employment Office (INEM in Spanish).
This question is answered by all respondents, as some workers out of the labour force
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Fig. 16 Relationship with the Employment Office. Source: LFS
may be receiving benefits, such as pensions, or temporary of permanent incapacity.
It is possible to quantify the number of unemployed workers who report receiving
benefits using this variable.
In particular, the possible answers are ‘Registered, with Benefits’, ‘Registered,
No Benefits’, ‘Non-registered’ and ‘Doesn’t know’. The ‘Registered, with Benefits’
answer will be recorded as unemployment in the MCVL, while ‘Registered, No Ben-
efits’ should not. Unemployed people without benefits are the group that the LTU
correction is targeting. While individuals reporting not being registered can either not
have registered because they are not eligible for benefits or because they are first-
time job seekers. The MCVL is unable to capture first-time job seekers, but the STU
expansion should capture those ineligible to claim benefits.
Figure 16 shows the evolution of the responses (in millions) in the 2005–2013
period. The ‘Registered, with Benefits’ line looks very similar to the rawMCVL series,
as expected. The stock of ‘Registered, No Benefits’ on the other hand keeps increasing
beyond 2009, reflecting the workers whose benefits expired after the recession. The
amount of non-registered unemployed increased only slightly during the recession.
Using these stocks, we can construct alternative unemployment rates and compare
them to the MCVL and its expansions.
Figure 17 shows the results of this comparison. In all panels, the Registered with UI
line represents the unemployment rate that considers only unemployed people who
report receiving unemployment benefits. The All registered line adds the unemployed
registeredbutwithout benefits,which should correspond to theLTUexpansion. Finally,
the solid black line represents all of the unemployed in the LFS while the red line
corresponds to the MCVL and its expansions.
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Fig. 17 Alternative unemployment rate series—registered unemployed. Source: MCVL and the LFS
The first panel shows raw MCVL unemployment is consistently over Registered
with UI. However, both series have very similar trends. The difference can be coming
from two sources: those who report receiving unemployment benefits but are never-
theless registered and those who are claiming unemployment benefits but who report
as not actively searching for employment. There are reasons why a person may still
be registered with the employment office even if she is not receiving unemployment
insurance. For example, in order to claim discounts and other benefits. The MCVL
will record these cases.
The second panel shows how the expanded LTU follows the All registered line
pretty closely, even after the recession. This result provides a strong argument in
favour of always using the LTU expansion when working with the MCVL. The final
panel shows the difference between the STU expansion and the rest of the lines. As
discussed in Sect. 4.1, the STU overestimates unemployment when compared with the
LFS, particularly before 2008.
Does this disparity come from people who are out of the labour force but still
claim unemployment benefits? The raw MCVL series will capture those individuals.
Figure 18 shows three different measures.All with benefits includes all individuals that
are registered and claiming benefits—both active searchers and non-participants. All
registered adds the former active searchers and non-participants that are not receiving
unemployment benefits but that are registered with the employment office. Finally, All
registered + non-registered unemployed adds non-registered unemployed workers.
Consider the raw MCVL data (first panel of Fig. 18). If this measure included all
active and inactive claiming benefits, it should match the All with benefits line. This is
not the case, as the raw MCVL data lies above this alternative measure. As discussed
above, theMCVLmaybepicking up someworkerswho are registered but not receiving
benefits. The fact that the raw MCVL is higher than the sum of active and non-active
searchers means that it is capturing some extra-registered unemployment.
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Fig. 18 Alternative unemployment rate series—all unemployed. Source: MCVL and the LFS
The second panel of Fig. 18 is crucial. If we include all registered individuals (with
benefits or not, active or not) then the LTU line should align with this measure. But
this is not the case, as the LTU line is always below this measure. This result shows
that the LTU expansion (and by extension, the raw MCVL) is not simply picking up
registered non-employment. The individuals in the MCVL are mostly highly attached
individuals.
This idea is further reinforced by the third panel: if the STUexpansionwas including
all unemployed workers and all registered non-participants, it should align with the All
registered + non-registered unemployed line. However, it is consistently below except
a brief period in 2007. Based on the duration of the spells and the demographics, the
STU must be capturing some unregistered but highly attached individuals. We know
that most of the spells added by the STU expansion are mostly short, in between job
periods. These unemployment spells are hard to capture in the LFS and thus should
not appear as either unemployed or out of the labour force.
6 An application to labour market flows
This section presents an application that combines both datasets, using the MCVL to
address two issues of the LFS: attrition (non-responsiveness) of unemployed workers
the effects of changes in survey design in 2005 in labour market flows. These flows
are very relevant, as they help us to understand unemployment dynamics.
6.1 Attrition and labour market flows
The LFS is a rotating, panel, such that each household is interviewed in 6 consecutive
quarters. I define attrition as a respondent failing to respond to two interview, one after
the other. The size of the attrition bias has not been constant over time. Figure 19 shows
the share of respondents who report being unemployed any given quarter but do not
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Fig. 19 Attrition of unemployment stocks in the LFS. Source: LFS
respond to the survey in the next quarter. These workers are not in their last interview,
so they should have answered. For example, about 8% of all individuals reporting
being unemployed in the 2000–2005 period do not respond in the next quarter. After
2005, that number shoots up to over 15%, reaching 20% in some quarters.
The LFS tries to correct for this problem by changing the weights attached to
the observations and introducing more people into the sample. These modifications
make stocks consistent over time. However, if we want to calculate labour market
transitions, the weights alone do not solve the problem. This issue is not unique to the
Spanish LFS. Labour market flows researchers follow different approaches to correct
for attrition. For example, Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013) and Elsby et al. (2015)
take the stocks as given, and adjust some transition rates, so that the flows are consistent
with the evolution of the stocks.
I use a much simpler approach. Consider the transition from state X to Y as the
number of observed individual transitions between X and Y , divided by the sum of all






Assume that there is attrition in this data, but rather than having an effect on the
flows from X to Y it affects the number that remain in their original state. Then the
denominator would be lower than it should be, as the non-respondents are not in
the sample. Consider instead the transition rate defined in Eq.2: number of observed
individual transitions between X and Y , divided by the number of observed individuals
in state X .
24 I define transitions rates forward—from one quarter to the next. The literature tends to use the backwards
approach—transitions from the previous quarter to the present. This distinction does not matter for results.
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Fig. 20 Labour market flows in LFS. Source: LFS. Shows quarterly observed transition rates, using as the
denominator: the observed stock of workers in a given state (stocks) and the sum of the flows originating





This way, the transition rate would be consistent with the data. In practice, attrition
can affect all of the flows out of state X , so the resulting bias of λXYt,flows is ambiguous.
We can consider the case of λXYt,stocks as the extreme case when all of the attrition comes
from those who remain in their original state. Figure 20 shows the evolution of λXYt,flows
and λXYt,stocks from 1987 to 2013. There is not much difference between the two except
for the flows between unemployment and temporary contracts. Here the gap is very
noticeable in the 2005–2008 period, which coincides with the attrition spike in Fig. 19.
The gap is also noticeable for the temporary to unemployment (TU) flow after 2008.
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The MCVL does not suffer from this bias, as we can observe more precisely the
changes in labour status of workers. Once workers are added to the data, they remain
in it. The definitions of unemployment are different in both, as discussed, but given
that the expansions align them more closely we can compare the resulting transition
rates to the LFS. As the MCVL does not suffer from attrition issues, comparing the
LFS and the MCVL can give us some insight into the source of the discrepancies in
the LFS flows that are due to attrition.
Of course, theMCVL does not identify non-participants. Being able to capture non-
participation is themain advantage of the LFS.We know that there are significant flows
between unemployment and inactivity. These flows have been extensively discussed
in the literature.25 The approach in this paper is to focus on flows among labour force
participants as it is hard to separate non-participation and unemployment in theMCVL.
As discussed previously, trying to identify non-participation in the MCVL presents an
empirical challenge beyond the scope of this paper. Ignoring transitions into inactivity
may bias the flows from the MCVL downwards, as the denominator (stock of those
remaining in unemployment) may be overstated. Another potential source of bias is
that some non-participants may be mistakenly included in the denominator as well.
However, as shown in Sect. 5.4, there is evidence that not all non-participants claiming
unemployment benefits are in the raw or expanded MCVL. While it is not possible to
quantify this bias, it is not too large.
Another source of downward bias in the MCVL is the frictional unemployment
it captures. Some frictional or very short-term unemployment is captured in the raw
MCVL (see Fig. 7), and the STU expansion increases this further. If the LFS fails
to capture these short-term workers, as discussed previously, then the flows out of
unemployment will be higher in the MCVL.
Figures 21 and 22 compare the flows resulting from the LFS to the MCVL. The
LFS (flows) line shows the transition rates from the LFS calculated as in Eq. 1 (the
denominator being the sum of transitions) while the LFS (stocks) line shows it as
in Eq.2 (the denominator being the stock).26 The blue lines correspond to the LTU
expansion and the red line to the STU expansion. Given the increase in the attrition of
unemployed workers in 2005, I present the series from 2003.27
In general, the level and trend of the flows are close between the two datasets. The
MCVL series has both higher seasonal variation, which is due to the higher frequency
of the data. TheLFS struggles to capture these seasonal increases, leading to a smoother
series. Notice as well that the LFS (flows) line is always higher than LFS (stocks). This
suggests that the unemployed individuals who do not respond to the next interview
remain unemployed.
Figure 21 shows the flows out of unemployment in the LFS and the MCVL in
its two expansions. The first thing to note is that in both the LFS and the MCVL the
flows to temporary contracts are an order of magnitude higher than those to permanent
jobs. Regarding flows to temporary contracts, before 2005 both MCVL expansions
25 See for example Elsby et al. (2015).
26 When calculating the stock, I naturally exclude those who are in their last interview, as they would not
reply in the next quarter because they are out of the sample.
27 The observations from before 2005 are from the 2005 file, so there might be some small representative
issues. These are unlikely to be substantial, as we only go back for 2years earlier in the sample.
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Fig. 21 Flows out of unemployment
Fig. 22 Flows into unemployment. Source: MCVL and the LFS
are very close to the stock version of the LFS. TheMCVL exhibits a more pronounced
seasonality, as noted before. Then, in 2005, the transition rates from the LFS increase
sharply. This increase is more pronounced in the LFS (flows) series, where it stays well
over 0.25 until 2008. There is no evidence of a similar break in the MCVL series. This
result shows that the attrition problem may be behind the large flows to temporary
contracts observed in the LFS using the flows accounting approach. But this does not
explain why using the stocks approach also results in a visible increase in 2005—an
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increase that is not backed by the MCVL flows. The break in the survey design of
2005 may also play a role.
After the recession, the distance between all series reduces. The STU and LTU
flows are almost identical after 2008, while before that the STU was above the LTU
series. This disparity is likely due to the frictional unemployment captured by the STU
during the boom. Notice that if we look at the MCVL or the stocks LFS, the fall in
the job finding rate was not as dramatic as implied by the LFS. This finding is very
relevant for papers that try to decompose the variance of unemployment, such as Silva
and Vázquez-Grenno (2013).
The right panel of Fig. 21 shows that the unemployment to permanent flow is higher
in the MCVL, but the differences are small—notice that the scale is only from 0
to 8%. The missing contract modification variable before 2005 could explain the
divergence of the MCVL prior to that year. This result is a reminder that the data
cannot be used retrospectively without problems, and of the importance of the contract
modification cleaning step that is outlined in “Appendix”.The fall in the unemployment
to permanent flow is not as sharp in the recession as the unemployment to temporary
flow.
Figure 22 shows the results for flows into unemployment. As before, the STU
expansion seems to be adding short spells from temporary contracts that otherwise
would count as job-to-job transitions. The LFS does not capture these quick changes
well and has a tendency to smooth them out, so both LFS series are below the STU
expansion before the crisis. Recall that the denominator in this case is the stock of
temporary contracts. There should, therefore, be less bias in the MCVL than in the
case of flows from unemployment. This changes after the recession, as job destruction
increases considerably. Towards the end the LTU series falls below the LFS, while the
STU series aligns with the LFS. This result underlines the importance of capturing
unemployed individuals without the right to claim benefits that have not found a job by
the end of the sample. As a final note, the unemployment to permanent rates are higher
in the STU than the LTU series, and both are above the LFS. The absolute differences
are minimal, as this rate is again an order of magnitude less than the temporary to
unemployment flow.
In conclusion, the flows from the expanded MCVL are very close to the LFS. This
result provides strong evidence that the MCVL is capturing actual unemployment. If
the workers added by the expansions were non-participants, they would behave differ-
ently from regular unemployed workers in the LFS. That does not seem to be the case.
Moreover, the MCVL suggests that the volatility of the unemployment to temporary
transition rate is lower than what the LFS suggests after 2005. The combination of
both datasets brings new insights into how labour market flows behave in Spain.
6.2 Changes in survey design: temporary to permanent flows
Attrition is not the only challenge when computing labour market flows with the LFS,
changes in the structure of the interview can cause severe discontinuities. These breaks
are not present in stocks, because the National Institute of Statistics (INE) ensures that
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Fig. 23 Quarterly flows: between contract types. Source: MCVL and the LFS
stocks are consistent over time. Figure 23 shows one of the main breaks in the flows
between different types of contracts (TP and PT).28
The transition rate between temporary to permanent was between 4 and 5% before
2005, which was consistent with the literature on contract upgrading (see Güell and
Petrongolo (2007) for an example). Immediately after 2005, the transition rate shoots
up to 12% (or 16% following the flows calculation). There is another spike in 2006,
which coincides with a labour market reform that encouraged conversion of temporary
to permanent contracts.29 The MCVL series, on the other hand, does not display an
abrupt increase in 2005, although it shows a 12%spike in 2006.Anatural interpretation
of this discrepancy is that firms already told workers they wouldmake them permanent
employees before the contracts changed—and hence the survey responses pre-empt
the administrative data.Whether this is in fact the case is a question for further research.
The right panel of Fig. 23 shows a similar pattern, where the LFS permanent to
temporary flow (PT) increases from 1 to 6% before slowly falling back to previous
levels. In contrast, theMCVL only increases to 1.7% before falling after the recession.
7 Conclusion
Administrative datasets are an important source of information for economists, but
they also present some challenges. In this paper, I have analysed the case of the
28 Other flow rates that suffer breaks relate to non-participation. However, since the MCVL cannot speak
to non-participation flows, then there is nothing administrative data can add to that question.
29 In particular, all temporary contracts converted to permanent before 2007 benefited from a tax exemption
scheme. Firms reacted very strongly by upgrading many temporary contracts in the last quarter of 2006.
This reaction suggests that firms widespread use temporary contracts is due to its lower cost. It seems that
a simple tax rebate is enough to overcome all of the screening problems that the firm may have and would
induce it to upgrade them to permanent positions.
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SpanishMuestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), a rich administrative dataset
containing working histories of a representative sample of the Spanish workforce.
However, it has important shortcomings in its original format. In particular, the way
it records unemployment spells. In this paper, I presented an approach to expand
the data by including two kinds of missing unemployment: long-term and short-term
unemployment.While the first expansion is widely applied in the literature, the second
expansion offers an alternative to considering all gaps as non-employment spells. I
then check the results of these expansions using the LFS unemployment rates as a
benchmark.
Most of the large gap between the LFS and the MCVL unemployment is explained
by the workers affected by the long-term expansion. These are mostly long-term
unemployed workers whose benefit entitlement expires before they find a new job.
Their importance increases in the years of the crisis. However, this expansions alone
underestimates unemployment, particularly for women and young workers.
The second expansion adds short-term unemployment spells of workers that are not
entitled to receive unemployment benefits. After adding these workers, the gap closes
down in the recession, but it overestimates unemployment compared to the LFS. This
is likely due to the frictional nature of these spells, mostly linked to short temporary
contracts. The changes in composition over the business cycle indicate that these spells
were less common in the recession. A possible interpretation is that mobility, through
quits or short temporary contracts, slowed down in the recession.
I provided further robustness checks to both expansions and the general methodol-
ogy to build the panel. The results support the assumptions made, such as restricting
the expansion of unfinished spells to those starting within the last years of the sample.
These checks also provide empirical support to common assumptions in the literature.
Finally, I analyse the main implications for the study of labour market flows, which
traditionally use Labour Force Surveys. The MCVL provides some insight into two
main challenges faced by these datasets: attrition bias from unemployed individuals
failing to respond for two consecutive quarters and changes in the survey. Overall, the
flows from the MCVL match those from the LFS, which supports the idea that the
datasets are comparable. However, there is considerable evidence that the temporary
job finding rate may have been overestimated before 2008 because of attrition bias.
The MCVL and the LFS together provide a more comprehensive picture of the
evolution of the labour market. There are also some general lessons that can be applied
to similar administrative datasets in other countries. In particular, it is necessary to
make sure that unemployed individuals without benefits count as being unemployed.
Frictional unemployment, which the LFS cannot capture, is becoming increasingly
important which calls for a more widespread use of microdatasets that can effectively
capture high-frequency movements.
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This appendix aims to give an overview of how to format and structure the MCVL in
four main steps: joining files, identifying workers status, cleaning overlapping spells
and building a panel. This last step allows for the comparison of the results of different
unemployment expansions to the LFS. If the researcher wants to use the MCVL as a
series of spells per worker, there is no need to build a panel.
Please note that this appendix gives a general overview of the methodology devel-
oped in this paper. The full online appendix gives a more comprehensive, step-by-step
guide.30
Joining the files
The files containing the working histories are the “ficheros de afiliación” files. These
have different names depending on the wave of the MCVL but are easily identifiable.
After appending these files, so all observations are in one folder, two other files need to
be merged: the “personal” file and the “pensiones” file. The first file provides essential
individual information, such as the date and province of birth, gender and nationality.
The “pensiones” file provides retirement information, which allows identifying tran-
sitions to retirement. Because the purpose of this paper is working population labour
stocks and flows, I only keep the spell where theworker becomes a full-time pensioner.
The next step is to repeat this process for each year, and then join all the years in a
single file. This roughly follows Arranz et al. (2011) approach. Using the start and end
dates and the firm codes, repeated spells can be safely discarded. Bear in mind that
later files add some information to some individuals that was missing in the previous
year files.
Identifying worker status
After joining the files, the first step is creating a variable that classifies workers in
four labour market status: self-employment, working with a permanent (open-ended)
contract, working with a temporary contract and unemployed. It is important to sepa-
rate both kinds of contract because their dynamics are very different, with temporary
contracts accounting for most of the flows in and out of unemployment.
The only category missing is out of the labour force. The administration does not
provide reliable information to judge whether an individual is participating in the
labour market or not. This lack of information on participation is the main drawback
of administrative datasets. There is a separate question of whether the distinction
between unemployment and out of the labour force is essential for labour market
flows. Looking at the LFS, for workers in the 20–60 age range, the transition rates to
employment from unemployment are very similar to transitions to employment from
30 This is available, together with the STATA code, at http://github.com/crisla/MCVL.
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out of the labour force, 12% versus 10%. This similarity highlights the shortcomings
of the official definition of unemployment. This discussion is however beyond the
scope of this paper. For classification purposes, following other authors (García Pérez
2008; Lapuerta 2010; Arranz et al. 2011) I assume registered unemployed workers are
genuinely unemployed, and that retired workers and periods where the MCVL has no
information are out of the labour force spells.31
In theMCVL, three variables contain all the information needed to classifyworkers:
1. Type of labour relationship codes the different links each worker has with the
social security—working, receiving unemployment benefits. Here it is possible to
identify unemployed workers.
2. Contract type contains the code for each type of labour contract. There are 557
different contract codes in the registry, but most of them are “legacy contracts” that
do not exist in the present.32 Most temporary contracts are grouped under the 400s
numerical codes while regular contracts are in the 100s. This way I distinguish
between temporary or permanent (open-ended) contracts.33 Temporary contracts
cannot be renewed beyond 2years with the same firm and are subject to smaller
severance payments than regular contracts. As discussed above, their dynamics
are very different.
3. Contribution class allows for the identification of self-employed workers, as they
follow a different contribution system. These correspond to variable values 500–
600.34
These three variables have the necessary information to classify most observations,
but there are exceptional cases. Most notably, some unemployed workers close to
retirement pay their social security contributions as if they were employed. By doing
this, they can boost their pension. Other examples include discontinuous and seasonal
workers and students that receive benefits under apprenticeship contracts. The online
appendix provides a comprehensive list of these exceptions.
Cleaning overlapping spells
Many workers have different labour status at the same time. Having simultaneous
spells may not be an issue of many applications, but as García Pérez (2008) argues,
many overlapping spells are administrative errors—such as recording the end of one
spell before the start of the next one. Another example corresponds to workers who are
working part-time and receive compensatory unemployment benefits while working.
These workers will have an unemployment and employment spell simultaneously. For
31 In particular, in order to keep their benefits, unemployed workers are formally required to: prove they
are actively searching for a job, attend job interviews and not to reject job offers. The Employment Centre
monitors workers at least each month upon receiving the payments.
32 There are some kinds of contract that are extinct—usually subsidised contracts created in the 1990s.
These are not relevant to the present study, which focuses on the 2005–2013 period.
33 For the special case of discontinuous workers (those who work only on specific periods every year), I
treat them as permanent, as they are subject to firing costs and are open-ended.
34 There are some special categories for domestic workers, agriculture workers, farmers and sailors. I select
those who are self-employed in these special regimes and treat the rest as employees.
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these reasons, García Pérez (2008) recommends trimming the start and end dates of
spells to avoid overlaps and dropping unemployment spells that overlap with employ-
ment. See García Pérez (2008) for more details.
After these easy adjustments, a small number of spells remain where the worker
has two or more jobs simultaneously. Depending on the study, these simultaneous jobs
can be kept or dropped. The objective of this paper is to build a panel of labour statuses
to quantify labour market stocks and flows. At this stage, I do not take a stance on
whether to drop overlapping spells or whether to keep them and leave that decision to
the building the panel phase.
One final note of caution relates to conversions of temporary contracts into per-
manent contracts and vice versa. These changes are not recorded in separate spells.
Instead, the variable “modificación de tipo de contrato” keeps track of the change.
Splitting these spells into two is convenient. More detailed instructions can be found
in the online appendix.
Building the panel
In order to build a panel, we need to select one observation per individual per unit
of time. I choose the quarter as the time unit to keep consistency with the LFS. In
each quarter, I select a date at which I will evaluate people’s working states: the 1st
of January, 1st of April, 1st of July and 1st of October, which coincide with the start
of the year’s quarters. Because some jobs may start after that date, I also consider all
the spells in the following two weeks, until the 15th of each month.35 In the LFS, the
interviews take place during a long period in each quarter. This way, some individuals
are interviewed at the beginning and some at the end of each quarter. For workers
that have two or more labour status in the same 2-week period (2% of all spells)36 I
give priority to the longest spell: if a worker starts the 2-week observation window
unemployed but finds a job that lasts for one more quarter, I count her as employed in
that quarter (Tables3, 4, 5; Figs. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28).
35 This corrects for short periods in which the worker may not be in either state. For example, it is likely
that many jobs will start on the 7th of January instead of the 1st, due to the Christmas holidays in Spain
ending on the 6th.
36 Of these 2%, roughly a quarter belong to two or more simultaneous temporary contracts. For the purpose
of building unemployment rate series, the choice between them is irrelevant.
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Table 3 Summary statistics of unemployment spells
No modification LTU expansion STU expansion
Observations 1,151,839 431,562 723,830
Share 0.499 0.187 0.314
Age 39.63 36.86 31.41
(10.50) (10.32) (10.29)
Female 0.448 0.482 0.464
(0.497) (0.499) (0.499)
Duration (days) 131 430 205
(193) (494) (286)
Experience PC 6.228 4.039 1.891
(7.668) (5.911) (3.842)
Experience TC 3.945 3.227 1.796
(3.081) (2.613) (2.086)
Experience unemp 2.416 2.082 0.749
(2.488) (2.05) (1.401)
Sample is all unemployment spells ending in the 2005–2013 period. Averages with standard errors in
parenthesis. Experience is measured in years, duration of the spell in days. Experience of Unemp refers to
previous years of experience in registered unemployment only
Table 4 Previous status of unemployed workers
No modification LTU expansion STU expansion
Self-employment 7,789 4,152 86,529
(0.007) (0.01) (0.120)
Permanent contract 308,146 115,323 128,479
(0.270) 0.27 (0.177)
Temporary contract 825,010 308,148 508,822
(0.723) (0.72) (0.703)
Total 1,140,945 427,623 723,830
Sample is all unemployment spells ending in the 2005–2013 period. Shares of the total in parenthesis
Table 5 Next status of unemployed workers
No modification LTU expansion STU expansion
Self-employment 18,763 25,810 50,979
(0.018) (0.075) (0.079)
Permanent contract 196,503 57,556 79,477
(0.189) (0.166) (0.124)
Temporary contract 821,702 262,653 512,284
(0.792) (0.759) (0.797)
Total 1,140,981 427,652 723,830
Sample is all unemployment spells ending in the 2005–2013 period. Shares of the total in parenthesis
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Fig. 24 Unemployment spells by expansion by year. Notes Each bar represents a year, from 2004 to 2013
(both inclusive). Raw number of unemployment spells, by unemployment expansion and contract type
Fig. 25 STU expanded spells by type by year. Notes Each bar represents a year, from 2004 to 2013 (both
inclusive). Raw number of unemployment spells, STU expanded, by category
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Fig. 26 Seasonality of unemployment by reference week, raw MCVL
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Fig. 27 Seasonality of unemployment by reference week, LTU expansion
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Fig. 28 Seasonality of unemployment by reference week, STU expansion
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